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In 2004,1  the Trondheim District court in Norway 
declared a card holder had acted with gross 
negligence based on the fact the unauthorised 
payment transactions on the card holder’s bank 
card were conducted in a relatively short time period 
after the card was stolen. While pointing out that the 
security system had previously had been considered 
‘unbreakable’ and had, over time, proved to be 
breakable, the court decided that the PIN of the stolen 
payment card could not be broken in the short time 
demonstrated in this case. It is suggested that the 
Norwegian District court’s ruling is wrongly decided, 
since it did not take into account the speed of change 
in technology, including the continuous advancement 
of intervention technologies. The paper also questions 
the court practice in Norway, which seems to lean 
towards the bank rather than the customer in cases of 
misuse of payment cards with or without using the PIN. 
A similar case from 2012 will be discussed to support 
this argument.
Summary of the facts
The misuse of a card can happen either because the card 
is copied or stolen.2  Case Number 04-016794TVI-TRON 
dated 24 September 2004 concerns a bank card issued 
to Bernt Petter Jørgensen that was misused after being 
stolen. The card was called a Cresco Card issued by the 
Norwegian bank, DnB NOR Bank ASA.
A number of cards were stolen at around 15.00 to 15.20 
on 4 August 2001. Four withdrawals were debited on the 
card in dispute totalling Nok. 9,628, each in the sum of 
Nok. 2,407 and respectively happened at 16:13, 16:14, 
16:15 and 16:19. Jørgensen’s other cards were blocked 
at around 16:10 by LOfavør StopService, an organisation 
with the authorization to block many bank cards 
simultaneously after the customer makes a telephone call 
to alert the bank to the loss of a card. LOfavør StopService 
is only allowed to block bank cards that are reported to 
LOfavør StopService, which did not occur in relation to the 
stolen Cresco Card. Jørgensen nonetheless argued that 
the person receiving his call in LOfavør StopService asked 
the Cresco Card to be blocked, but it did not happen. The 
Cresco Card was finally blocked on 7 August 2001 when 
the bank received the blocking request.
The Norwegian Complaints Board for Consumers 
in Banking, Finance and Mutual Fund matters 
(Bankklagenemnda ‘Complaints Board’)3  was first to 
examine the case. By a majority (3 to 5), the Complaints 
Board considered the Cresco Card was misued because 
of Jørgensen’s gross negligence. It was noted that the 
withdrawals happened only a short time after the Cresco 
Card was stolen, and furthermore, all the withdrawals 
were made by using correct PIN on the first try. Based 
on these facts, the majority of the members of the 
Complaints Board presumed it was most likely that 
the PIN of the Cresco Card was kept in the same wallet 
together with the stolen cards. The minority members of 
the Complaints Board considered that the case was too 
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poorly argued and therefore should be dismissed.
Jørgensen later argued before the Trondheim District 
court that the code to his Cresco Card was kept in a safe 
in his house and not kept together with the stolen cards. 
He also argued that efforts to block his cards were started 
immediately, as demonstrated by his telephone call to 
LOfavør StopService, and the blocking of his other bank 
cards before the misuse of his Cresco Card took place. 
The bank should be held responsible for the transactions 
that were conducted after the blocking of his other cards, 
according to Jørgensen.
The bank argued that Jørgensen reported the theft late. 
The withdrawals from the Cresco Card happened with 
the correct PIN on the first try. This fact, according to the 
bank, suggested that the PIN had been kept together with 
the misused Cresco Card.
The legal issues
Some legal issues of the case and implications on the 
legal practice are discussed below.
Burden of proof
Both Jørgensen and the bank rejected the claim that they 
had the burden of proving that Jørgensen had acted with 
gross negligence in relation to the misuse of the Cresco 
Card. The court decided that the bank had the burden of 
proving that Jørgensen had acted with gross negligence. 
This is line with a basic principle under the Norwegian civil 
procedural law which generally places the burden of proof 
on the person who has brought the case to the court or 
the plaintiff.4 
Level of security
One main concern in the use of payment cards is the 
level of system security protecting the cards from any 
misuse by unauthorized parties.5  The court considered 
that Jørgensen had acted with gross negligence, while at 
the same time the court also doubted whether the PIN 
of the Cresco Card was capable of being broken in the 
short period of time between the theft and the misuse 
of the card. The court seemed to be reluctant to make 
an express statement as to whether the Cresco Card had 
a lower or the same security level with cards otherwise 
found in the market at that time. The actual level of 
system security in Cresco Card was not proven before the 
court. In addition, some expert witnesses testified that the 
PIN under the earlier double-DES system could be broken. 
However, the same experts also provided different 
opinions with respect to how long it takes to break a PIN 
in that particular system.
From expert witness testimony, it appeared that the 
highest level of security for a bank card is the triple-DES 
system, because the code under this system is believed 
to be unbreakable. The court noted that another system, 
the double-DES system, can be broken in terms of 
minutes, seconds or hours. Before the triple-DES system 
was introduced, the double-DES system was considered 
as unbreakable. The court did not expressly declare 
which of these systems was in use in the Cresco Card. 
However, the court expressed doubts that there was an 
opportunity to ‘break’ the card’s code in the short time 
span between the stealing of the card to its misuse. By 
doing so, the court was implying that the code in the 
Cresco Card was not protected by an unbreakable security 
system, the triple-DES security system, and accordingly 
was breakable. Given the system under which a code can 
be broken is the double-DES security system, then it can 
be submitted that the court perhaps considered, albeit 
impliedly, that the Cresco Card was protected by double-
DES security system.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the court had 
knowledge that the level of security of the PIN in the 
Cresco Card was lower than the best available technology 
in the market at that time. That the court did not address 
the adequacy of security system provided in Cresco Card 
is worthy of criticism, especially given the vast amount 
of work on this topic by the team at the University of 
Cambridge Computer Laboratory.6  Using a security 
system that can be broken poses risk to banks as well 
as customers. The risk of the unauthorised use of stolen 
cards is logically higher using the double-DES system 
than in the ‘unbreakable’ tripple-DES system. Jørgensen 
could have argued that even if the Cresco Card fell into the 
hands of a thief, the card would not have been misused 
if the bank had used the highest level of security in the 
card. If this argument is capable of succeeding, then 
arguably the bank should share responsibility together 
with customer in case of the misuse of a card, even if 
the misuse was made possible by the customer’s gross 
negligence.
unauthoriZed use of bank cards with or without the pin: a lost case for the customer? 
4  Jo Hov, Rettergang (Oslo: Papinian, 2010), 
pp. 1148-1149.
5 Dr Charles Wild, Neil MacEwan, Stuart 
Weinstein and Neal Geach, Electronic and 
Mobile Commerce Law (Hatfield: University 
of Hertfordshire Press, 2011), p. 30.
6 For instance, see: http://www.cl.cam.
ac.uk/research/security/publications/; 
Professor Ross Anderson - http://www.
cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/; Dr Steven J. Murdoch 
- http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/; 
Light Blue Touchpaper - http://www.
lightbluetouchpaper.org/.
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 9 (2012)        97© Pario Communications Limited, 2012
unauthoriZed use of bank cards with or without the pin: a lost case for the customer? 
Liability for misuse
Jørgersen was considered to have acted with gross 
negligence since he, as presumed by the bank and 
endorsed by the court, must have kept the PIN together 
with the stolen Cresco Card. Jørgersen stated from the 
beginning the PIN to his Cresco Card was kept in a safe 
in his house, and was not near the Cresco Card. Setting 
aside for later the discussion on whether the card and the 
PIN were indeed kept together, it is interesting to note 
that the Norwegian legal practice has long considered 
the keeping of a PIN together with the associated card 
as gross negligence, even if the card and the code have 
been securely kept.7  It is not considered gross negligence 
if the code is kept nearby the card in a secured place. 
However, the code must be in a well-disguised to make it 
unreadable to others.8 
A customer may not be declared to have acted with 
gross negligence when keeping the PIN and the card 
nearby each other if two conditions are fulfilled. First, 
the card holder must have disguised the code. A card 
holder’s creativity in disguising the code can be a decisive 
element in determining whether he has acted with gross 
negligence. Second, it is also required that both the 
card and the disguised code are kept in a secure place. 
Limiting access to both can be achieved, for example, 
by placing the card and the disguised code in a locked 
container in a car, locked cabinet in an office or school, or 
a safe in a house.
From the foregoing, it is suggested that a customer 
will be considered as having acted with gross negligence 
if the customer keeps the PIN and the card together 
in an unsecured place (where it is possible for other 
persons to have access to the card) and the code is not 
well disguised. In other words, two security features are 
expected to be in place. First, the access to the physical 
card and code must be secured. Second, the code must 
be in a disguised form that makes it difficult for others to 
know the actual code.
Evidence
The general rule cited by the court in the case was Ot. 
Prp. (1998-99) Number 41, which stipulates that a court 
should not assume that a customer acts with gross 
negligence unless there is specific evidence of this. The 
legal reasoning centers around the fact that if a PIN is 
known to an unauthorised party, it is not a sufficient 
ground to assume that customer has acted with gross 
negligence. Relating the requirement of specific evidence 
to the security features mentioned previously, it is 
suggested that to declare a customer as having acted with 
gross negligence, the court must have evidence that (i) 
access to the physical card and code is not limited to the 
customer, and (ii) the code that is kept together with the 
card is in a badly disguised form, making it possible for 
others to know the code.
Despite the foregoing, the court inferred that it was 
most likely that the code had been kept by Jørgensen 
together with the card in a badly disguised form that 
made it possible for others to know the code – in other 
words, he was not telling the truth. The bank did not 
submit any evidence as to whether the code, which was 
allegedly kept together with the card, was disguised or if 
the code was disguised, whether it was disguised badly. 
The court did not go into specific discussion on the code’s 
form of representation. The problem is that the court’s 
declaration that Jørgensen had acted grossly negligencely 
was not supported by the evidence required by the law.
The reasoning on which the court grounded its 
jugdment that Jørgensen had acted grossly negligently 
is not clear. As previously discussed, the court was of the 
opinion that the level of security provided in the Cresco 
Card was not the highest, and further implied that the 
code may have been broken if the time period between its 
stealing and misuse was longer than actually happened. 
Expert witness testimony seemed to lend support to this 
opinion. So it was clear that the court did not doubt that 
the PIN in the Cresco Card was breakable.
In the absence of specific evidence that (i) Jørgensen 
had indeed kept the PIN together with his Cresco Card and 
(ii) the code that was allegedly kept together with the card 
was not disguised or badly disguised, it is questionable 
why the court considered that Jørgensen was not telling 
the truth. Indeed the court noted that the experts had 
different opinions on how long the code in double-DES 
security system can be broken ranging between seconds, 
minutes or hours. However, the misuse happened in more 
or less one hour after the card was stolen, which is within 
the time frame mentioned by the experts. Therefore, there 
7 For example: Bankklagenemnda 
95352/96010, BKN 91459/93041, BKN 
92306/94030 and BKN 95073/95070. 
See also Susanne Kartstoft, Elektronisk 
betaling i forbrugerforhold -ansvars- og 
bevisproblemer- retlige overvejelser ved 
brug på interntettet, TemaNord 1998:590, 
First Report (Copenhagen: Nordisk 
Miniterrad, 1998), p. 130. For a general 
discussion, see Stephen Mason, ‘Debit 
cards, ATMs and negligence of the bank 
and customer’, Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law 
(March 2012): 163-173, which includes case 
law from a number of jurisdictions.
8 See: BKN 96094/96042, BKN 
93399/95024 and BKN 96177/96043. 
See also: Susanne Kartstoft, Elektronisk 
betaling i forbrugerforhold -ansvars- og 
bevisproblemer- retlige overvejelser ved 
brug på interntettet, TemaNord 1998:590, 
First Report (Copenhagen: Nordisk 
Miniterrad, 1998), pp. 130-131.
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was a possibility, however small, that the code of the 
Cresco Card was broken in the short time period between 
the theft and misuse of the card. Furthermore, the court 
also did not explore the possibility that the thiefs might 
either (a) have obtained the correct PIN easily, or (b) 
have used an intervention technology device that made 
withdrawals possible without the correct PIN, since the 
authorization terminal can be led to believe that the 
correct PIN was entered.9 
Even if it is to be argued that the court was of the 
opinion that the security provided in the card is the 
unbreakable triple-DES system, the court should have 
been more thorough and elaborate in its reasoning. 
The court noted itself that a system security that was 
considered unbreakable before, the double-DES system, 
turned out to be breakable after all. This was made 
possible by the development of intervention technology. 
Given the continuously rising speed of developments in 
technology, the court should have shown awareness of 
the possibility that a technology, no matter how good it 
is, may be broken by tomorrow’s technology. Intervention 
technology that facilitates crime is mostly developed by 
persons with bad intentions, who keep a low profile, and 
therefore it is not possible to be fully sure if the latest 
developments in intervention technology have out-run 
the highest level of technology the banks implement have 
at any given time.10  The nuance was not captured in the 
court judgment in the case.
Customer protection
Presumably, the court did not want to declare the code 
in the Cresco Card was broken because there was no 
evidence to that effect, and the bank had argued that the 
code in the Cresco Card was of high security level. Here 
the court had acted with prudence.
Unfortunately, court prudence did not seem to be 
implemented when examining Jørgensen’s conduct. It 
was clear that the bank did not have any evidence of 
Jørgensen keeping the code together with the Cresco 
Card, and Jørgensen had argued that code of the Cresco 
Card was locked in a safe in his house. Despite this 
evidence, the court declared Jørgensen had acted with 
gross negligence. It was as if the court had considered 
the mere fact that the Cresco Card had been used with 
the alledgedly correct PIN was sufficient evidence of the 
grossly negligent conduct of the customer.
From the foregoing it can be submitted that the court 
had leaned towards banks instead of the customer. In 
itself this tendency is worthy of criticism. Customers have 
limited resources to prove that they had not acted grossly 
negligently. Customers also have no say on which type of 
security system that is used by the bank. On the contrary, 
banks can easily allocate resources to investigate or prove 
matters. Banks also decide the level of security to be used 
in payment cards. By leaning towards the bank rather 
than customers in doubtful circumstances such as in 
this case, the court protected the resourceful rather than 
the weaker party. Such an approach is against the basic 
principle of consumer protection law that provides and 
encourages protection of parties with weaker bargaining 
position.
The tendency of the Norwegian courts to lean 
towards banks was also shown in the recent and much 
discussed Øiestad case.11  The facts of the case are as 
follows: Paal Øiestad was in Rome in September 2008 
on holiday, together with his partner and son. A credit 
card from MasterCard owned by the family was stolen 
and the card was charged with over Nok 50,000 before 
it was cancelled. The Øiestad family had three cards 
with the same code and they used the cards every day. 
Øiestad insisted that they had not written down the code 
anywhere, because they had committed the code to 
memory. The bank, DnB NOR Bank ASA, argued before 
the Complaints Board and the District Court that the 
customer had acted with gross negligence by allegedly 
keeping the PIN together with the stolen and misused 
bank card. This meant that a thief could misuse the card. 
As background reasoning, the bank referred to the fact of 
the timing between the last use of card by the customer 
and that the misuse of the card occurred within one day. 
The bank won the case before the Complaints Board and 
District Court. Øiestad appealed the case.
While waiting for the examination by the appeal court, 
Øiestad received a letter from DnB NOR dated 12 June 
2012.12  Under the letter, the bank offered an apology for 
having accused Øiestad and his family of gross negligence 
by keeping the PIN together with the card. The letter 
mentioned that the bank just recently had been informed 
9  For a description of this intervention 
technology, see Dr. Stephen J. Murdoch, 
‘Chip and PIN is broken’, ISSE GI-Sicherheit 
2010, available at http://www.cl.cam.
ac.uk/~sjm217/talks/isse10chipandpin.pdf.
10 Maryke Silalahi Nuth, ‘Taking advantages 
of new technologies: For and against crime’, 
Computer Law and Security Report 24(5) 
(2008), 437- 446.
11 Svein Erik Furulund, ‘Blir ikke trodd av 
DnB NOR’, Aftenposten, 1 February 2010, 
available at http://www.aftenposten.
no/okonomi/innland/Blir-ikke-trodd-av-
DnB-NOR-5317185.html; see also: Ida 
De Rosa, ’Kortsvindel sak kan få følger 
for mange’, Aftenposten, 27 June 2012, 
available at http://www.aftenposten.no/
okonomi/Kortsvindelsak-kan-fa-folger-for-
mange-6915861.html; Karina Jørgensen, 
’Helomvendig fra Storbank’, NRK, 27 June 
2012, available at http://www.nrk.no/helse-
forbruk-og-livsstil/1.8222700.
12 A translation of the letter is included in the 
annex to this article, and a scanned copy of 
the original letter is available at http://www.
forbrukerrådet.no/_attachment/1130286/
binary/8413.
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  15 Online banking services and the need for 
amendments to the Financial Contracts Act 
to implement the Payment Services Directive 
in Norway, see: Banklovkommisjonen 
(Banking Law Commission), Norges 
offentlige utredninger 2008:21 (Oslo: 
Departementenes servicesenter 
Informasjonsforvaltning, 2008), pp: 7-10.
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by their sub service supplier that transactions on the 
Øiestad family MasterCard in Rome in 2008 had been 
conducted without using any PIN, as had been argued 
by the Øiestad family from the beginning. The Øiestad 
family and the bank agreed to settle the case amicably. 
The bank agreed to pay for all the costs incurred by the 
Øiestad family (including legal fees and court fees) and 
the Øiestad family received compensation from the bank.
The issue on how the unauthorized use of the Øiestad 
family’s card could be used without using the PIN is not 
discussed here. It should be noted that the bank in the 
Øiestad case happens to be the same bank behind the 
issuance of Jørgensen’s Cresco Card. The arguments 
submitted by the bank in the Øiestad case seem to be 
similar to those in Jørgensen’s case. The implication of 
this case on the Norwegian court practice has yet to be 
seen.
It took three years before the Øiestad family was 
notified by the bank that the transactions on Øiestad’s 
misused card was conducted without using any PIN. 
The bank, as in the Jørgensen case, did not submit any 
evidence that Øiestad had kept the PIN together with the 
stolen card. Notwithstanding, the Complaints Board and 
court found that Øiestad had acted with gross negligence. 
Again, the court, as in Jørgensen case, leaned towards 
the bank, because the court was willing to declare 
Øiestad had acted with gross negligence without specific 
evidence, and the court instead put much emphasis on 
the fact that the stealing and misuse of the card took 
place within a day.
Both the Jørgensen case and the Øiestad case show 
that the task to ascertain fully whether a customer has 
acted grossly negligently is certainly not an easy one. In 
both cases, the banks failed to submit specific evidence 
that their customers had acted with gross negligence. For 
customers as the party with lesser resources, it is even 
more difficult to prove that they had not acted grossly 
negligently. In examining cases of misuse of cards, 
the court should have at least required the bank to put 
forward data and information logs of the unauthorized 
payment transactions showing whether PIN was indeed 
used. Based on the case circumstance and examination 
in both the Jørgensen case and the Øiestad case, it is 
suggested that the respective courts should not have 
so readily accepted such poor quality evidence from the 
banks.
Applicable rules and its developments
The legal basis used by the court to set the liability in 
the Jørgensen case was section 35 paragraph 2 of Lov 
om finansavtaler og finansoppdrag [Finansavtaleloven] 
25.6.1999 No. 46 (Act on Financial Contracts and Financial 
Assignments)13  (‘Financial Contracts Act’) as applicable 
in 2004. Under this Act, an account holder is liable for 
up to kr 8,000 for loss caused by the misuse of his or 
her card if (i) the misuse is made possible by the grossly 
negligent behaviour of the card holder, or (ii) the account 
holder failed to notify the loss to the card issuer as soon 
as possible or within the reasonable time after the loss 
should have been discovered.
Since 2004, the Financial Contracts Act has been 
amended twice by way of Law Number 81 dated 19 juni 
2009 nr. 81 as enforced on 1 November 2009 (‘Amended 
Act of 2009’) and Law Number 42 dated 18 nov 2011 nr. 
42 as enforced on 1 January 2012 (‘Amended Act of 2011’). 
These amendments were conducted to implement the 
Payment Services Directive14 in Norway.15
The prevailing general rules relating for responsibilities 
relating to use of payment instrument are provided under 
section 34 of Amended Act of 2009 as follows:  
1.  A customer who has the right to use a payment 
instrument shall use it in accordance with the 
conditions of the issuance and use of the payment 
instrument, and shall take all reasonable precautions 
to protect the personal security system associated with 
the payment instrument as soon as the instrument is 
received. In addition, the customer shall without undue 
delay inform the institution or the party the institution 
has nominate, if the customer becomes aware of 
the loss, theft or misappropriation of the payment 
instrument, or unauthorized use (section 34 paragraph 
1). 
2.  The institution issuing a payment instrument shall, 
without any consequence on customer’s duty provided 
on point 1 above, ensure the personal security system 
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associated with the payment instrument is not 
accessible to anyone other than the customer who is 
entitled to use the payment instrument. In addition, the 
institution shall ensure that the customer at any time 
may make notification referred to in point 1 above or 
request that any blocking of the payment instrument 
be repealed. The institution shall also ensure that 
the customer, within 18 months from date of such 
notification, may provide written evidence to have 
made such a notification, and shall also prevent any 
use of a payment instrument after the said notification 
has been made (section 34 paragraph 2). 
3.  The institution bears the risk of sending a payment 
instrument to the customer and personal security 
system associated with the instrument (section 34 
paragraph 4).
As can be noted from the above, in the case of stolen 
cards, section 34 of Amended Act of 2009 provides clarity 
as to the card holder’s obligations to report the conditions 
that pose a risk of misuse arises that is, at the moment 
the card holder actually obtains knowledge that the card 
is stolen.16 
Furthermore, section 34 of the Amended Act of 2009 
provides an obligation on the bank to ensure the personal 
security system associated with the payment instrument 
is not accessible to anyone other than the customer who 
is entitled to use the payment instrument. It is submitted 
here that this section can be used as a legal basis to 
require banks to put in place a high level security system 
that can ensure that no unauthorized use of a payment 
instrument can be conducted. This is certainly a welcome 
development to correct the practice of using low level 
security systems in payment card protection.
Another article of relevance to the topic of this paper 
is section 35 of the Financial Contracts Act. This section 
was the subject of an amendment both in the Amendment 
Act of 2009 and the Amendment Act of 2011. The section 
is applicable to both debit and credit cards and contains 
provisions relating to the misuse of account and payment 
instruments as follows: 
1. The institution shall generally be considered 
responsible for all losses due to unauthorized payment 
transactions unless otherwise provided by this 
section. A payment transaction is unauthorized if the 
customer has not consented to the transaction (section 
35 paragraph 1).
2. The customer shall be liable for up to Nok. 1,200 for 
loss by an unauthorized payment transactions due 
to the use of a lost or stolen payment instrument 
if the personal security procedure is used, or due 
to misappropriation of a payment instrument if the 
customer has failed to protect the personal security 
system and the bpersonal security system is used 
(section 35 paragraph 2). 
3. The customer shall be liable for the entire loss on 
unauthorized payment transactions if the loss is due to 
negligence by the customer or the customer has failed 
to meet one or more of its obligations under section 34 
paragraph 1. If the payment transaction has occurred 
with the use of an electronic payment instrument, 
the customer shall only be liable up to Nok 12,000. If 
the loss is because the customer has willfully failed 
to fulfill their obligations under section 34 paragraph 
1, the customer shall bear the entire loss. The same 
applies if the loss is due to the customer having acted 
fraudulently (section 35 paragraph 3). 
4. Unless the customer has acted fraudulently, the 
customer shall not be liable for losses resulting from 
the use of lost, stolen or unauthorized payment 
instruments that take place after the customer has 
notified the institution that pose serious use of 
misuse of payment card – for example that a payment 
instrument is lost or a code or other security procedure 
may have become available to unauthorized persons. 
The customer is not liable for any loss as mentioned if 
the institution has not ensured that the customer can 
make such notification (section 35 paragraph 4). 
5. If the customer denies having authorized a payment, 
the use of a payment instrument is not in itself to be 
regarded as sufficient evidence that the customer has 
agreed to the transaction, or that the customer has 
acted fraudulently or willfully or grossly negligently 
failed to fulfill one or more of its obligations under 
section 34 paragraph 1. The institution shall have to 
prove that the transaction was authenticated, properly 
registered and recorded and not affected by technical 
failure or other error (section 35 paragraph 5).
The above-mentioned amendments to section 35 of 
Financial Contract Act offer much clarity in relation 
to the distribution of liability in cases of the misuse 
of payment cards. More protection to customers is 
16 See also BKN 2011-028 and BKN 2011-039.
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provided by way of the express stipulation that the use 
of a payment instrument in itself cannot be regarded 
as sufficient evidence that the customer has acted 
fraudulently or willfully or grossly negligently, which in 
the Jørgensen case seems to be the situation. In addition, 
the section also sets a clear placement of burden of 
proof by stipulating that the institution or bank shall be 
the party responsible to prove that the transaction was 
authenticated, properly registered and recorded and 
not affected by technical failure or other error. This is in 
line with the principle of consumer protection providing 
protection to the weaker party such as bank customers.
Concluding remarks
The Norwegian legal practice has for some time shown 
a tendency to lean towards banks in cases of misuse of 
payment cards. Customers have been declared by courts 
to have acted with gross negligence, even though no 
specific evidence to that effect was submitted before 
the court. The Jørgensen case is an example of such an 
experience. The development of legal rules in Norway 
since 2004 have been helpful in providing clarification 
on some issues relating to the distribution of liability in 
the case of misuse of payment cards, while at the same 
time promoting better customer protection. The recent 
development in the Øiestad case brings hope of a change 
in the Norwegian legal practice that each bank and their 
customers shall be placed in their respective rightful 
position.





Our ref: OP KBT Kontotjenester Elektronisk kanal/
PSvOSLO, 13                                           
Date: June 2012
Stolen MasterCard
I refer to our telephone conversation on Monday 12 June 
and the meeting that you and Supreme Court barrister 
Arne Meltvedt had with our attorney Trond A. Lie 
regarding the abovementioned matter.
The bank was recently informed by our sub service 
supplier that the PIN code was not used with your stolen 
Master Card in Rome 2008. You were right in your claim, 
and that is now confirmed.
We can only strongly regret that you and your family 
have lived with these accusations for over three years, 
and there are no grounds for claiming that you have been 
negligent.
Again, we can only apologize.
With warm regards
For DNB Bank ASA
Petter Sverreng
Seksjonsleder
- DNB Bank ASA   
Postadresse: NO-0021 Oslo  
Tif: 04800  
Foretaksregisteret:  
www.dnb.no
Besøksadresse: LØRENFARET 1 A, OSLO  
Faks: NO 984 851 006 MVA 
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